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FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
interpretation, as parties would not be allowed to profit at public and
private expense from their own intentional acts. A definitive de-
termination of the uncertainties58 now existing in the statute would
allow more effective administration of the statute, would give the
dog owner more adequate notice of the degree of responsibility
placed on him by the statute, and would enable the county, because
the basis of the dog owner's liability is made clear, to defend and
prosecute more effectively suits under the statute.
SUSAN H. EHRINGHAUS
Torts-Rights of Servicemen under Federal Torts Claim Act
Of the enumerated exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act,'
none have created more litigation than the judicially imposed bar
to members of the armed forces prohibiting their suits against the
United States for injuries incurred incident to service. Since 1950
when the Supreme Court handed down the decision in Feres v.
United States,2 the courts have dogmatically rejected such suits by
servicemen.' With some degree of boldness, Judge Gray in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
denied the government's motion to dismiss an action admittedly fall-
ing within the prohibition enunciated in Feres, i.e., actions "for in-
juries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service."'4 In this case, Lee v. United
States,5 Judge Gray reasoned that by its decisions in a series of re-
cent cases the Supreme Court has vitiated its grounds for precluding
actions by servicemen for injuries incident to service wherein the
" There are procedural uncertainties in the statute as well as substantive
ones. The statute is silent on what would happen should the dog tax fund
be insufficient to discharge all the claims coming before the county, as well
as on the point in time at which the dog tax fund, after payment of claims,
is released to the schools.
128 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1964).
2340 U.S. 135 (1950).
'E.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964)
cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (servicemen travelling in line of duty
on airline which collided with Air Force jet fighter); Buer v. United States,
241 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1956) (serviceman injured by negligence of army
surgeon while in "sick in hospital" status); Kilduff v. United States, 248
F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Va. 1960) (serviceman's injury based on government's
negligent failure to disclose results of physical examination).
'340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
'261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
11291967]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
injuries do not stem from activities that involve an official military
relationship between the negligent government employee and the
claimant. In Lee, plaintiffs alleged negligence by the Federal Avia-
tion Agency, not part of the military, for causing the aircraft crash,
and the resulting injuries. The historical development behind the
Feres exception to Tort Claims Act liability takes on interesting
significance in light of Judge Gray's conclusion that Feres is no
longer a correct statement of the law.
The Supreme Court accepted the common law doctrine of sover-
eign immunity from suits by citizens early in its history.' The in-
justice of this doctrine was mitigated in a series of legislative acts
granting relief.' Of special importance, the Tucker Act of 18878
waived sovereign immunity for actions "not sounding in tort." But
until the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, private
bills in Congress provided the only means of compensation for citi-
zens wrongfully injured by federal employees.' The Tort Claims
Act waived the sovereign immunity of the United States from tort
liability for injury or damages caused by negligence or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the government, while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act oc-
curred. 10 The statute also grants authority for administrative settle-
ment of claims of 2,500 dollars or less by the head of the federal
agency affected."'
The statute precludes recovery in thirteen enumerated excep-
tions.' 2 Among the excluded, were claims "arising in a foreign
' Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269 (1868); Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792).
'E.g., Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 851, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1498
(1964) (waived immunity for patent infringement); Federal Employees
Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 742 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 751 (1964)
(provided comprehensive benefits for injured federal employees); Public
Vessels Act of March 3, 1925, 43 Stat, 1112, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§
781-90 (1964) (allowed libels in personam against United States for damage
caused by its vessels).
828 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1402, 1491, 1496-7, 1501, 1503, 2071, 2072, 2411,
2501, 2512 (1964).
' See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 (1963).
1028 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
1128 U.S.C. § 2672 (1964).
1" See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964). Of the enumerated exceptions, § 2680(h)
which bars recovery against the United States for intentional torts of its
employees, such as assault, battery, and slander, is of particular significance.
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country,"' 3 and claims "arising out of combatant activities"'1 of the
armed forces. Otherwise, the serviceman was not specifically ex-
cluded from benefits of the Act. During the years preceding enact-
ment of the Tort Claims Act, a number of bills were introduced in
Congress to waive the immunity of the government from general
tort liability.'5 Most of these bills provided that cases covered by
Federal Employees Compensation Act, 6 or the World War Veter-
ans Act of 1924,"7 were excepted. The obvious intent was to exclude
claims by federal employees or military personnel who were pro-
vided other statutory means of relief. Upon the enactment of the
Tort Claims Act, this exception was omitted. It must be concluded
that Congress was aware of this omission since the bill as originally
introduced excluded any claim arising out of activities of the armed
forces during time of war but was amended before passage to ex-
clude only combatant activities.' The omission must mean either
that servicemen were intended to acquire benefits under the Act, or
that Congress believed such specification unnecessary in light of the
generally accepted common law barring such suits. Legislative his-
tory of the Act provides no explanation for the omission.
The first case to reach the Supreme Court concerning the rights
of servicemen to sue the United States for injuries incurred during
military service was decided in 1948. This case, United States v.
Brooks,'9 involved the death of one serviceman and injury to an-
other in an automobile accident while on furlough. The injuries
were caused by the negligence of a civilian employee of the Army
driving a United States Army truck. The Court held that servicemen
were permitted to bring suit against the government for injuries
sustained while on authorized leave from duty and not incident to
service. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court, noted, "where the
accident incident to the Brooks' service, a wholly different case
would be presented."20
The "wholly different case" was presented to the Supreme Court
1528 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1964).
1428 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1964).
1 See United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49, 51-2 (1949); Note, 1 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 87, 90-1 (1949).
1'39 Stat. 742 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 751 (1964).
1'43 Stat. 607 (1924).
", See United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 848 n.5 (4th Cir. 1948).
19337 U.S. 49 (1949); 50 COLUm. L. REv. 827 (1950); 35 CORNELL
L.Q. 233 (1949).
20337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
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one year later in Feres v. United States.2' In Feres, the Court con-
sidered three cases22 presenting a common issue of "whether the
Tort Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining 'incident to
the service' what under other circumstances would be an actionable
wrong." In Feres, the decedent perished by fire in an Army bar-
rack while on active military duty. Negligence was alleged in allow-
ing him to be quartered in barracks known or that should have been
known to be unsafe because of a defective heating plant and in
failing to assure an adequate fire watch. In affirming dismissal of
the action the Court recognized that the enumeration of specified
exceptions "might also imply inclusion of claims such as we have
here, '24 but felt the necessity to construe the statute to fit "into the
entire statutory system of remedies against the Government to make
a workable, consistent and equitable whole, ' 25 to be an overriding
consideration. The primary purpose of the Act was to provide a
remedy for the remediless. This did not include servicemen who
were provided other relief. The Court noting the statutory lan-
guage, "The United States shall be liable... as a private individual
under like circumstances ,"26 found no analogous circumstances
to meet the statutory requisite. The liability assumed by the govern-
ment is created by all the circumstances, "not that which a few of the
circumstances might create." 27 Hence, the landlord-tenant circum-
stance in Feres could not be isolated from the broader sovereign-
soldier relationship. Since the serviceman was not free to choose
his location, the Court did not believe that Congress intended a cause
of action for him which would fluctuate with the various state laws.
The Court also noted the distinctly federal character of the rela-
tionship between a member of the armed service and his govern-
ment.2 s The legal incidents of such relationship can be derived only
21340 U.S. 135 (1950); 3 ALA. L. Rav. 429 (1951); 31 B.U.L. REV. 221
(1951).
2 Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949); Jefferson v.
United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949) (injury caused by negligence
of army surgeon); United States v. Griggs, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949)
(death of army officer through negligent medical treatment by army sur-
geons)."2340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
24Ibid.
25 Id. at 139.
2828 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
27340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950).
"The Court referred to its prior recognition of the relationship as "dis-
1132 [Vol. 45
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from federal sources and governed by federal authority. Further,
the Court seemed strongly persuaded by the comprehensive benefits
provided for the injured serviceman under prior statutes. In con-
cluding, the Court held that: "The Government is not liable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the
injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to ser-
vice."' 9 It was this statement of the law that Judge Gray in Lee v.
United States"3 felt was no longer authoritative.
In Lee v. United States,1 two marines on active duty were being
transferred by air from a California station to Viet Nam. The air-
craft, operated by the Military Air Transport Service, United States
Air Force, crashed in departure for the overseas flight. The two
marines, and others, were killed. The plaintiffs made no charge
against the Marine Corps or the Air Force, but alleged negligence
on the part of the Federal Aviation Agency in operating, maintain-
ing and controlling the departure of the aircraft from the ground
and in giving inadequate terrain clearance information. The gov-
ernment moved to dismiss on the ground that, as a matter of law,
the facts preclude recovery under the Tort Claims Act. This motion
was denied.
First commenting on the lack of any language in the Tort Claims
Act which would indicate that servicemen are to be deprived of the
benefits of the Act in the circumstances in point, Judge Gray quoted
from the decision in United States v. Brooks by Justice Murphy:
We are not persuaded that "any claim" means "any claim
but that of servicemen." ... It would be absurd to believe that
Congress did not have the servicemen in mind in 1946, when this
statute was passed. The overseas and combatant activities ex-
ceptions make this plain.
3 2
This argument appears less viable today. Accepting that the omis-
sion of any specified exception for servicemen may have indicated
some Congressional intent to allow their suits, Congress has had
ample time since the Feres decision in 1950, to correct a misinterpre-
tation of the statute. Congress has remained silent since Feres con-
tinctly federal in character" in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301 (1947).
9 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
'1 Ibid.
22337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949).
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strued the Act disallowing servicemen's suits. In fact, the Act was
amended in 1959 to add the thirteenth exception to the list.3 No
indication is evident that Congress is displeased with prior judicial
construction of the Act. Judge Gray's inference of legislative intent
to allow servicemen's suits does not seem to overcome the presump-
tion of approval of the Feres prohibition of such suits found in
seventeen years of Congressional silence.
Taking each of the three assigned grounds for the conclusion
in Feres which would defeat the plaintiffs in Lee, Judge Gray re-
jected them in orderly succession as having been abandoned by later
decisions. Following is a closer look at the respective arguments
and a consideration of their validity.
1-To the argument that the serviceman already had a compre-
hensive system of relief and therefore was not intended to benefit
from the Act, the court cited United States v. Brown.4 In this
case, a veteran receiving compensation for a service-connected in-
jury to his knee, was further negligently injured by an operation
performed in a Veterans Administration hospital. The Brown
Court held that disability compensation under the veterans acts was
not an exclusive remedy and would not preclude recovery under the
Tort Claims Act. The Court distinguished the Brown facts from
Feres in that the injury for which recovery is sought occurred when
the claimant was not a member of the armed service. Hence, the
"distinctly federal character""5 of the relationship was lacking. As-
suming that Congress might have intended to exclude recovery un-
der the Act to servicemen injured while on active duty, the Court
recognized that there was no blanket exclusion intended for claim-
ants not members of the service at the time injured, who might be
receiving some form of federal compensation. Brown was explained
thusly, and specifically adhered to the Feres "incident to service"
test."8 The Lee court also cited United States v. Muniz, 37 in which
two inmates of a federal penitentiary sued under the Tort Claims
Act for injuries sustained due to the negligence of supervisory per-
sonnel. Relying on Brown, Chief Justice Warren in Muniz stated
" Act of August 18, 1959, 73 Stat. 389, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(n) (1964)
(claims arising from the activities of federal banks).
'348 U.S. 110 (1954).
' See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
13348 U.S. 110, 113 (1954).
13374 U.S. 150 (1963).
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that "the presence of a compensation system, persuasive in Feres,
does not of necessity preclude a suit for negligence"3 8 under the
Tort Claims Act. Two aspects of Muniz distinguish it from the Lee
and Feres fact situations, and, to a degree, detract from the signifi-
cance of the Chief Justice's statement. 1) The "distinctly federal
character" of the sovereign-soldier relationship relied upon in Feres
is lacking. 2) There was no compensation system available to
Muniz 3 9 Under the Muniz circumstances, recovery under the Tort
Claims Act was the sole remedy available for the wrongful injury.
Hence, the above quoted statement from Muniz was dictum.
Reconciling Brown and Muniz with Feres is made less difficult
by the rationale of a case handed down by the Supreme Court on
December 5th, 1966, only seven days before the Lee decision. This
case, United States v. Demko,4° held that the claimant who was re-
ceiving compensation for injuries sustained while an inmate in a
federal penitentiary was precluded from recovery under the Tort
Claims Act. The Court adhered to the rule laid down in Johansen
v. United States,41 that where "the government has created a com-
prehensive system to award payment for injuries, it should not be
held to have made exceptions to that system without specific legisla-
tion to that effect." 42 Demko distinguished Muniz in that the claim-
ant there was not eligible for the compensation received by Denko.43
A dissent in Demko was based on the grounds that the benefits re-
ceived by the claimant were too limited and that the statute provid-
ing compensation for prisoners was not sufficiently comprehensive.44
2-Judge Gray effectively countered the Feres argument that
28 Id. at 160.
'9 Ibid. See note 43 infra.,0385 U.S. 149 (1966). judge Gray cited this case without comment.
261 F. Supp. 252, 255 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
41343 U.S. 427 (1952). The Court in Johansen held that the existence
of a remedy under the Federal Employees Compensation Act precluded a
suit for damages under the public Vessels Act.
42343 U.S. 427, 441 (1952).
"Demko was awarded $180 per month to start upon discharge from
prison and to continue so long as the disability continued, under the Act of
June 23, 1934, 48 Stat. 1211, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 4126. The Act pro-
vides compensation for "injuries suffered in any industry or in any work
activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution
where confined." Demko fell within this provision; Muniz did not.
" Mr. Justice White noted in the dissent that the compensation under
the Act was permissive not mandatory, that compensation did not become
a vested right, and that the amount rested within the discretion of the
Attorney General. 385 U.S. 49, 155-6 (1966).
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there were no analogous circumstances for a private individual's
liability as a prerequisite to United States' liability by citing Indian
Towing Co. v. United States.4 5 There, the Supreme Court allowed
recovery for damages resulting from the grounding of a tug due to
the negligence of the Coast Guard in the operation of a lighthouse.
In a subsequent decision, Rayonier Inc. v. United States,46 the Court
found that an injury caused by the negligence of firefighters em-
ployed by the government was actionable under the Tort Claims
Act. In neither case did the activity, operating lighthouses for
navigation and fighting forest fires, have "analogous circumstances"
in the non-governmental area. The Court established that govern-
mental liability under the Tort Claims Act does not require that the
total circumstances under which the injury occurred be paralleled in
private activity.47 If the activity might conceivably be privately per-
formed, liability may be imposed.4"
3-As to the argument that the servicemen should not be left
victim to the varying state laws where injuries occur inasmuch as
he has no control over where his military duties might take him,
Judge Gray again cited Muniz. Commenting that prisoners likewise
have little discretion as to the state in which they dwell and hence
might be prejudiced, the judge quoted Chief Justice Warren in
Muniz, ". . . it nonetheless seems clear that no recovery would
prejudice them even more."4 It is significant to note that, in Muniz,
recovery under the Tort Claims Act was the only alternative and
the quoted statement was appropriate, but its validity is question-
able when placed in the context of Lee wherein a comprehensive
compensation system is available.
Judge Gray concludes from his survey of cases that the service-
man would not be precluded from recovery under the Tort Claims
Act when the official activities of the negligent party and those of
the injured parties are entirely unrelated. The decision implies
agreement with the views of several Supreme Court opinions50 that
"350 U.S. 61 (1955). See Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 134 (1956); Note,
54 M CH. L. REV. 875 (1956).
1-352 U.S. 315 (1957). See Note, 33 IND. L.J. 339 (1958); Note, 8
SYRAcusE L. REv. 277 (1957).
"See 352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957); 350 U.S. 61, 66-7 (1955).
" See 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955).
" 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963).
"United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) ; Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135 (1950); United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
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the significance of the judicially imposed exception lies primarily in
prohibiting suits involving "a battle commander's poor judgment,
an army surgeon's slip of hand, a defective jeep which causes in-
jury. ,51
The rule of recovery formulated by the Brooks and Feres de-
cisions has left an uneasy sense of dissatisfaction and uncertainty..
The case by case determination of whether the claimant's injury
was incident to service has not proved to be an easy task. A naval
reservist was allowed recovery under the Tort Claims Act for injury
in a Navy aircraft accident enroute to the station where active duty
was to begin.2 The court found the activity was not incident to
service. Recovery was allowed where an enlisted seaman on shore-
leave was drowned because of the negligent maintenance of a swim-
ming pool on a naval station.53 The activity was found not incident
to service. Injuries sustained through alleged negligence in a gov-
ernnent hospital were found not incident to service, and recovery
was allowed for a former member of the Women's Army Auxil-
iary.54 An Army nurse was denied recovery on a finding that the
injury was incident to service where the injury occurred in a Vet-
erans Administration hospital four years after her discharge. 55 A
sergeant injured while on a three day pass by an explosion demolish-
ing his on-base quarters was denied recovery,56 whereas recovery has
been allowed where the injuries were sustained in quarters off-
base.
5 7
It is submitted that the Lee "official relationship" test will be
subject to the same difficulty of application. At what point would
the relationship take on sufficient "officialdom" to bar recovery?
The rule would essentially prevent recovery under the Tort Claims
Act only where there exists an official relationship between the ac-
tivities of the negligent party and those of the injured party. To
accept this rule would lead to undesirable discrimination. A large
portion of the present military force is stationed in foreign coun-
tries. These servicemen would be automatically barred from re-
"United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
" Carroll v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
" Brown v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. W. Va. 1951).
"Herring v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 69 (D. Col. 1951).
"Pettis v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
"Gursley v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 614 (D. Col. 1964).
"Sapp v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. La. 1957).
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covery by section 2680(k) of the Tort Claims Act if the injury
occurred therein. Had the traffic controller's negligence in Lee
caused the crash in Thailand instead of California, there would be
no recovery. An increasing number of military personnel are en-
gaged in combatant activities, and are thus precluded from recovery
by section 2680(j) of the Act. Assuming wrongful injuries caused
by federal employees without an official military relationship to the
injured, it is difficult to infer Congressional intent to allow recovery
for all servicemen except combatants or foreign-stationed personnel.
In light of the Demko decision barring recovery to a prisoner
due to the comprehensive compensation system available to him
otherwise, a brief examination of the compensation provided for
the injured serviceman is helpful.
Title 38 of the United States Code is devoted entirely to the
administration of veterans' benefits. The benefits include compensa-
tion for disability or death; hospitalization, medical treatment, and
domiciliary care; burial allowance; loan guaranty for home, farm,
business or trade; educational assistance and others. For the dis-
abled veteran, the statute provides for compensation in accordance
with the degree of disability.5" The monthly compensation payments
may range from 17 dollars for peacetime disabilities rated at 10 per
cent,59 to 600 dollars for total disability under certain circum-
stances."0 Additional compensation provided for dependents of the
disabled veteran may range from 20 dollars per month for a wife,
to 68 dollars per month for a wife and three children plus 13 dollars
for each child in excess of three."' Death benefits to a widow are
determined by a formula based upon the serviceman's base pay.6 2
Provisions are also made for children and dependent parents upon
the death of a serviceman.6 3 An immediate death gratuity equal to
six months pay, not more than 3000 dollars nor less than 800 dol-
lars, is payable to dependents.6
A service-connected injury severing the right arm of an Army
Captain, age 30, would be rated as an approximate 80 per cent dis-
5838 U.S.C. §§ 314, 334 (1964).
'"38 U.S.C.A. § 314(a) (Supp. 1966); 38 U.S.C.A. § 334 (1959).0 U.S.C.A. §§ 314(o), (p) (Supp. 1966).
8138 U.S.C.A. §§ 314(o), (p) (Supp. 1966).
02 38 U.S.C. § 411 (1964) (establishes a monthly rate equal to $120 plus
12 per cent of the deceased husband's base pay).
03 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 413-16 (Supp. 1966).
0, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1475-80 (1964).
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ability by the Veterans Administration regulations. 5 Assuming that
this is a peacetime injury and that the Captain has a wife and one
child, age 6, disability payments per month would amount to 213
dollars until the child reached age 21, and 202 dollars thereafter.6 "
Should the Captain live for his expected life span,67 he will receive
in excess of 98,000 dollars for disability payments alone. The death
of this same Captain, assuming the above stipulations plus eight
years in service, from service-connected injuries, would entitle his
widow to compensation of 176 dollars per month. 8 Including an
immediate death gratuity payment of 3000 dollars,69 she can expect
during her normal life expectancy"0 aggregate compensation in ex-
cess of 84,000 dollars. In both illustrations, hospitalization, medical
treatment, and domiciliary care would be provided by the govern-
ment.71
Comparing recovery under the Tort Claims Act with the statu-
tory benefits available to the veteran, the Court in Feres took note
that in the companion cases, Jefferson would receive approximately
35,000 dollars, and Grigg's widow in excess of 22,000 dollars, under
the veterans compensation system at that time.72 The widow's maxi-
mum recovery by wrongful death action was limited to 15,000 dol-
lars by Illinois statute.73 Thirteen states by statute still limit the
amount of recovery for wrongful death actions.74 The median
maximum among these states is approximately 25,000 dollars. In
the prior illustration of the Army Captain, a considerable amount
in excess of this limitation would have been recovered under the
veterans' acts without the accompanying expense of litigation.
The serviceman will receive compensation under the veterans'
acts whenever the injury is determined to be service-connected, that
" 38 C.F.R. § 471(a) (1966).
6638 U.S.C.A. §§ 314(h), (k), 315 (Supp. 1966; 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 334-35
(1959).
", See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-46 (Supp. 1965), where by the mortuary
table therein, the Captain would have an expected life span of 40.39 addi-
tional years at age 30.
6838 U.S.C.A. § 411 (1959); 37 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp. 1966).
S10 U.S.C. § 1478 (1964).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-46 (Supp. 1965), where at age 30, the widow
would expect to live 40.39 years longer.
"38 U.S.C. §§ 610-16 (1964).
"340 U.S. 135, 145 (1950)." Ibid.
"See Comment, 44 N.C.L. Rav. 402, 426-7 (1966).
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is, an injury sustained in the line of duty.75 Any injury or disease
incurred by military personnel while on active duty status is deemed
to have been incurred in line of duty as long as it is not the result
of his own wilful misconduct.76 Active duty status expressly in-
cludes periods of authorized leave.7
The most compelling reason for not adopting the Lee extension
of liability under the Tort Claims Act lies in the policy objective of
arriving at a just, consistent, and rational rule to govern service-
men's suits. The only viable alternative to the present milieu of con-
flicting decisions and continuing litigation appears to be an accep-
tance of the availability of statutory compensation as an exclusive
remedy for the serviceman. He is now provided with an adequate,
fixed and certain scale of benefits for service-connected injury or
death. In view of the special relationship between the sovereign and
soldier, and the particular hazards of military life, the government
has provided adequate protection against injury or death for mili-
tary personnel. This protection is now provided without the expense
and uncertainty of litigation under the Tort Claims Act. To hold
that, where applicable, the statutory compensation system available
to members of the armed services is their exclusive remedy would
not prejudice their rights.
Congress has not spoken on the instant problem. Until it does,
the courts are responsible for formulating a just and equitable rule
of law. An appeal from the Lee decision will provide the 9th Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals an opportunity to apply the Dernko rationale
in the sovereign-soldier context. In light of the conflicts and prob-
lems resulting from the Brooks and Feres decisions and the approach
recently applied in Demko, there is reason to believe that the Supreme
Court may accept a rule formulated to exclude servicemen's Tort
Claims Act suits where veterans' compensation is available to the
claimant.
GERALD M. MAYO
'38 U.S.C. § 101(16) (1964).
7838 U.S.C. § 105 (1964).
Ibid.
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